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VALLEY ESTATES, INC., LAKE MILLS 
COMPANY, a Limited Partnership, 
First Defendants and 
Appellants, 
and CAROLE LEE CHRISTENSEN, formerly CAROLE 
LEE DAVIS, ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, 
INC., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCES, a Limited Partnership, JOHN 
DENNIS HIGGINSON and SHERREL HIGGINSON, 
aka RAYMA SHERREL W. HIGGINSON, his 
wife, R. W. DAVIS LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
VERL ROTHLISBERGER, EVE RHODES, 
EVELYN I. MILLS TRUST, FIRST SECURITY· 
HANK OF UTAH, N.A., and DALE A. ALLSOP 
and DONNA B. ALLSOP, his wife, 
Second Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NOS 15027 
15157 
15188 
BRIEF OF }1ILTON C. CHRISTENSEN, aka MILTON A. CHRISTENSEN, 
PARADISE VALLEY ESTATES, I:'IIC., LAKE mLLS COMPANY, 
a Limited Partnership, CAROLE LEE CHRISTENSEN, formerly 
CAROLE LEE DAVIS, and ENVIRON~1ENTAL RESOURCES, INC. 
First and Second Defendants and Apnellants 
Appeal from Judgment of Fourth D1str1ct Court of Utah County, 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by way of a supple-
mental complaint to enforce the terms of a Decree of 
Specific Performance. In short, the original action was 
filed by Hidden Meadows Development Company (Successor of 
East Heber Development Company, hereinafter referred to 
as Hidden Headows), respondent herein, against the first 
defendants, to determine the validity of an option 
granted by Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills in favor of the 
respondent. 
Subsequent thereto, trial was held in the 
Fourth District Court, in and for Wasatch County, wherein 
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District Judge, rendered 
judgment in favor of the first defendants and against the 
plaintiff (respondent herein) no cause of action. The 
court held that the option had been terminated, and that 
the Hidden Meadows, could not exercise the option. 
Subsequently, Hidden Meadows appealed the lower 
court's decision to the Utah State Supreme Court. 
Hidden Meadows moved the trial court for ~n order grant-
ing supersedeas and the trial court ordered the same, but 
on the condition ~hat Hidden Meadows file, and have 
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approved by the court, a bond in the sum of $50,000 in 
accordance with Rule 73(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No supersedeas bond was ever filed or approv~ 
Prior to the original trial, Dee Mills and 
Evelyn I. Mills, had transferred and sold the real prop-
erty in question to Milton A. Christensen, also known as 
Milton C. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and 
Lake Mills Company, a limited partnership. Following the 
trial, the latter sold the property in question to second 
defendants. Thereafter, the Utah State Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court's decision and directed the lower 
court to enter a decree entitling Hidden Meadows to speci· 
fie performance from Mills on the option to purchase the 
real property. (Hidden Meadows Development Company v. ~1ill 
29 Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 (1973)) 
Hidden Meadows then filed its supplemental 
complaint in the same action against the first defendants 
for specific performance consistent with the decision 
of the Utah State Supreme Court, and also named as second 
defendants those partiss who had purchased the prop-
erty in question, or succeeded to the same, after the 
judgment in the trial court on the original action and 
- 2-
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prior to reversal by the Utah State Supreme Court. Hidden 
Meadows allege that any interest the first or second 
defendants, appellants herein, assert in the property is 
inferior and subordinate to the interest of itself, and 
that a decree of specific performance should be granted, 
allowing the respondent herein to purchase the property 
under the option agreement. 
First defendants, Milton C. Christensen, also 
known as ~ilton A. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, 
Inc., and Lake ~ills Company, a limited partnership, 
and second defendants, Carole Lee Christensen·, formerly 
Carole Lee Davis, and Environmental Sciences, a limited 
partnership, allege that they were and are good faith 
purchasers of this property, and that Dee Mills and 
Evelyn I. Mills were not prohibited from selling or 
transferring the real property to them and conveying to 
them clear, complete and unencumbered title. It is 
further alleged that Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills were 
the legal title holders when they sold the property to 
the first defendants and the original judgment rendered 
by the District Court was self executing and cleared 
title in their names allowing the free alienation of 
the real property. 
- 3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin sitting without a jury, entered judgment for the 
plaintiff, Hidden Meadows, on its supplemental complaint 
and held that all purchasers were not bona fide innocent 
purchasers and were bound by the decision of the Utah 
State Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the Fourth 
District Court entered August 10, 1972 and the subsequent 
Decree of Specific Performance entered by the Fourth 
District Court on August 27, 1973. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the decree entered in the trial 
court after trial on this matter or, in the alternative, 
for remand to the lower court for application of proper 
measure of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about July 28, 1964, the appellants, Dee 
Mills and Evelyn I. ~ills, gave to Hidden Meadow's pre-
decessor in interest an option to purchase a tract of 
real property located in Wasatch County, Utah for a sum 
as specified in said Option, which Option was duly 
-4-
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recorded in the office of the Recorder of Wasatch 
County, Utah, on the 28th day of December, 1964, as 
Entry ~o. 86844. (F.l, R.224; R.9). Thereafter, on 
September 28, 1971, respondent notified said appellants 
Mills of its desire to exercise said option, but Mills 
refused to acknowledge the option and asserted that it 
had been terminated on September 4, 1971. (F.Z, R.224) 
On October 15, 1971, appellants, Dee Mills 
and Evelyn I. ~ills conveyed the real property, the 
subject of the option, to appellants, Milton C. Christensen, 
also known as Milton A. Christensen, Lake Mills Company, 
a limited partnership, and Paradise Valley Estates, 
Inc. (F. 3, R.224; Ex 6-P, 7-P) 
On or about December 10, 1971, Hidden Meadows 
commenced an action in the District Court of Wasatch 
County, State of Utah, seeking a decree of specific 
performance with respect to the option against the appel-
lants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills, Milton C. Christen-
sen, also known as Milton A. Christensen, Lake ~1ills 
Company, a limited partnership, and Paradise Valley 
Estates, Inc., and on December 10, 1971, Hidden Meadows 
-5-
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duly caused to be recorded in the office of the County 
-Recorder of Wasatch County, Utah, a Notice of Lis Pendens 
recorded as Entry No. 96131 in Book 78, at pages 84-85 
of said records (F. 4, R. 225). Subsequent to December 
10, 1971, appellants, Carole Lee Davis, Environmental 
Resources, Inc., and International Environmental Sciences, 
a limited partnership, acquired an interest in said real 
property from appellants Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills, 
Milton C. Christensen, also known as Milton A. Christensen, 
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and Lake Mills Company, 
a limited partnership. (F. 5, R. 225) On August 10, 1972, • 
the Fourth District Court in and for Wasatch County, 
Judge D. Frank Wilkins, presiding, entered judgment for 
the appellants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills, Milton 
C. Christensen, also known as Milton A. Christensen, 
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and Lake ~ills Company, a 
limited partnership, holding that the option given to 
Hidden Meadows was null and void. (F. 6, R. 225) 
Subsequent thereto Hidden Meadows timely appeal~ 
the judgment to the Utah State Supreme Court, Case ~o. 
13076 (F. 7, R. 226-227). In addition, Hidden ~1eadows 
(appellant in the former case) moved the trial court for 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an order granting supersedeas and the trial court ordered 
the same, but on the condition plaintiff file, and have 
approved by the court, a bond in the sum of $50,000 in 
accordance with Rule 73(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No supersedeas bond was ever filed or approved 
(F. 8, R. 226; R. 39, 44, 45, 137). 
On January 2, 1973 Mills entered into a Uni-
form Real Estate Contract with Carole Lee Davis, a single 
woman, thereby agreeing to convey any and all interest 
in the subject property to her, subject to the conditions 
set forth therein. (Ex 19D) Subsequent thereto, on 
January 3, 1973, Lake ~ills, a limited partnership and 
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., conveyed any and all in-
terest in the subject real property to International 
Environmental Sciences, a limited partnership, of which 
Carole Lee Davis was a partner. (Ex 8-P, 9-P) 
On July 5, 1973, the Utah State Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court's decision, and held the option 
given by appellants (respondents in former suit), Dee 
Hills and Evelyn I. Mills, to Hidden ~eadows Development 
Company, was valid, and thereafter, remanded the case to 
the lower court for an aopropriate order in consonance 
- 7-
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with the opinion. (Hidden Meadows Development Company 
vs. Mills, supra.; F.9, R. 226) Said court further 
decreed that Milton C. Christensen, also known as 
Milton A. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., 
and Lake Mills Company, a limited partnership, and all 
claiming under them or any one of them as against the 
plaintiff and its assig~s had no right, title or inter-
est in said property or any part thereof. (F. 10, R. 
226; R. SO) 
Thereafter, the appellants herein, Dee ~1ills an:/ 
Evelyn I. Mills, failed and refused to comply with the 
Decree of Specific Performance entered August 27, 1973, I 
on the grounds that said property, during the pendency 
of said appeal and in the absence of a supersedeas bond, 
was transferred to one or more of the following: 
Carole Lee Christensen, formerly Carole Lee Davis, 
Environmental Resources, Inc., International Environme~i 
Sciences, a limited partnership, John Dennis Higginson~ 
Sherrel Higginson, also known as Rayma Sherrel W. Higg~· 
son, Evelyn I. Mills Trust, First Security Bank of Utah. 
or Dale A. Allsop and Donna B. Allsop, his wife as bona 
fide purchasers (F. 11, R. 227). Subsequent thereto, a 
-8-
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Motion to Vacate Decree of Specific Performance was 
filed on behalf of appellants herein, (respondents in 
the former case) but that motion was never heard by the 
court. (R. 52) 
ARGUMENT 
The primary issue before this court is the 
duration of Lis Pendens and its effect on appeal when 
no supersedeas is filed. Emanating from this primary 
issue are numerous secondary questions which must 
necessarily be addressed in this brief and viewed by 
this court. 
POINT I. 
THE EFFECT AND DURATION OF LIS PENDENS 
TERMINATES ON FINAL JUDGMENT FROM THE 
LOWER COURT UNLESS SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS POSTED 
The facts of the instant case clearly illustrate 
that the rea~ property which is the subject of this 
action was conveyed by the owner thereof to those 
individuals and entities captioned as the "second 
defendants" following a final judgment in the lower 
court establishing the right of the owners, Dee Mills 
and Evelyn I. Mills and others so captioned as "first 
defendants" to alienate the real property and declaring 
the option to respondent herein, null and void. 
It is the position of appellants that the effect 
- 9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the I stitute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and duration of Lis Pendens terminates when judgment is 
entered in the lower court and could not be extended by 
Hidden Meadows Development Company without the filing of 
the necessary supersedeas bond to preserve the status 
quo following judgment. It is obvious that the taking of 
an appeal does not alone operate as a supersedeas and a 
stay must be ordered and allowed in order to preserve the 
subject matter or res of the suit. 
The statutory provision setting forth the 
requirements for Lis Pendens is contained in U.C.A. 
Section 78-40-2 (1953) as follows: 
Lis Pendens. In any action affecting the 
title to, or the right of possession of, 
real property the plaintiff at the time of 
filing the complaint or thereafter, and the 
defendant at tne time of filing his answer 
when affirmative relief is claimed in such 
answer, or at any time afterward, may file 
for record with the recorder of the county 
in which the property or some part thereof 
is situated a notice of the pendency of the 
action, containing the names of the parties 
the object of the action or defense, and a 
description of the property in that county 
affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a pur-
chaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the pendency of the action, 
ana-only of its pendency against parties 
designated by their real names. (Emphasis 
added.) 
-10-
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Although the parameters surrounding the 
filing and contents of the documents itself are covered 
in the statute, nothing is set forth regarding the 
total effect and duration of a Lis Pendens. 
Generally, the doctrine of Lis Pendens continues 
operative during the pendency of the action or suit until 
it becomes final. Whether a Lis Pendens remains in effect 
and applies during the time for appeal depends on whether 
the appeal is regarded as a continuation of the suit. See 
54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens, Section 36. 
Whether or not the judgment of the lower court 
is final for the purpose of terminating Lis Pendens has 
not yet been decided by the Utah State Supreme Court. 
It is abundantly clear that the law in the State 
of Utah requires that an appeal may be taken only from 
final orders and judgments in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 72(a) provides: 
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court 
from all final orders and judgments in accor-
dance with these rules; provided, that when 
other claims remain to be determined in the 
-11-
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proceedings, a party may preserve his right 
to appeal on the decided issue until a final 
determination of the other claims by filing 
with the trial court and serving on the ad-
verse parties within the time permited in 
Rule 73(a) a notice of his intention to do so. 
The phrase "final judgment" was defined in the 
case of North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. The 
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896), 
an action brought seeking an injunction restraining defen-
dants from polluting a surplus canal and neighboring land. 
In holding that a party may not appeal an order pendente 
lite, which is not a final order or judgment, leaving 
issues remaining undecided, the court stated: 
The word "final" or "final judgment" has a plain 
meaning. A judgment, to be final, must dis-
pose of the case as to all the parties, and 
finally dispose of the subject matter of the 
litigation on the merits of the case. Champ 
vs. Kendrick, (Ind. Sup.) 30 N.E. 635. JjQii"Vier 
defines a final judgment as used in opposi-
tion to interlocutory as "A final judgment is 
a judgment which ends the controversy between 
the parties litigant." The general rule 
recognized by the courts of the United States 
and by the courts of most, if not all of the 
states, is that no judgment or decree will 
be regarded as final, within the meaning of 
the statutes in reference to appeals, unless 
all the issues of law and of fact necessary 
to be determined were determined, and the 
case completely disposed of, so far as the 
court had power to dispose of it: Freem . 
.Judgm. P. 34. 
-12-
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The policy of the laws of the several states 
and of the United States is to prevent un-
necessary appeals. It is not the policy of 
courts to review cases by piecemeal. The in-
terests of litigants require that cases shall 
not be prematurely brought to the highest 
court. The errors complained of may be cor-
rected in the court in which they originated; 
or the party injured by them might, notwith-
standing the injury, have final judgment in 
his favor. If a judgment interlocutory in 
its nature were the subject of appeal, each of 
such judgments rendered in the case could be 
brought before the appellate court, and liti-
gants harassed by useless delay and expense, 
and the courts burdened with unnecessary 
labor. Freem. Judgm. P. 33. The reason of 
the rule is obvious. A party against whom 
an interlocutory order is made may have all 
his wrongs redressed and his rights protected 
upon a final hearing and therefore he has 
no ground of complaint. If these rights are 
not protected on a final hearing in the 
trial court, the error can be corrected on 
appeal from the final judgment. 
The amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have 
not altered nor attempted to change this general rule of 
law that an appeal lies only from a final order or judg-
ment disposing oE all issues in the action. 
As additional support for this position see 
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580 (1925), where-
in the court held that an order authorizing a receiver to 
issue and sell receiver's certificates displacing prior 
existing liens, not a final and appealable judgment as to 
-13-
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the State of Utah which had an existing mortgage lien on 
certain property and went on to state: 
Under our constitution and statute, an 
appeal lies only from a final judgment. 
This court in numerous cases has held 
that a judgment to be final for purposes 
of an appeal must dispose of the case as 
to all of the parties and finally dispose 
of the subject matter of the litigation 
on the merits, or be a determination of 
the particular proceeding or action, or as 
sometimes expressed, the case put out of 
court. 
When a judgment becomes final for all purposes 
has been a troublesome question for the courts and the 
decisions therefrom are not uniform. The principle that 
for purposes of the effect and duration of Lis Pendens, 
judgment becomes final when the subject matter of the 
litigation is determined on the merits is consistent wit~ 
the finality of judgments in the State of Utah with regar: 
to appeal. 
One thing is clear, however, from a reading of 
the lis pendens statute, supra., and that is its purpose 
is to effectuate constructive notice of the pendency of u 
action and not actual notice, contrary to the lower court; 
finding. (See: F. 12, R. 227) In addition, the 
-14-
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doctrine of lis pendens is to be viewed cautiously and its 
application strictly construed. As stated in 54 C.J.S. 
Lis Pendens, Section l(c): 
The doctrine of lis pendens is not a 
favorite of the courts and is not to be 
extended without strict necessity. Since 
its operation may be harsh in particular 
instances and is arbitrary, it will not 
be given effect when the reasons which 
give rise to it do not require its en-
forcement, and the limitations to the 
rule will be observed with the same 
rigidity as exists in the application of 
the rule itself. On the other hand, the 
rule admits of but few exceptions. 
Therefore, if lis pendens were terminated by the 
decision of the lower court or if its duration were affected 
or terminated by the failure of Hidden Meadows to file and 
post a supersedeas bond, then the lower court erred in 
holding that Carole Lee Christensen, formerly Carole Lee 
Davis and International Environmental Sciences, a limited 
partnership, were not bona fide innocent purchasers. (See 
Conclusions of Law 2, 3, R. 230) 
The operation and effect of supersedeas or stay 
proceedings and its relationship to the duration of lis 
pendens on appeal is also a matter over which the courts 
are divided. 
-15-
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The law is clear that the mere notice and 
filing of an appeal does not automatically stay the ju~~~ 
of the lower court while on appeal which decision is pre-~ 
sumed valid and accurate. The requirements to effective!· 
stay action upon, or execution of the judgment of the 
lower court, and to hold that judgment in abeyance while 
on appeal, are set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as follows: 
Rule 62(a) Stay Upon Entry of Judgment. 
Execution or other proceedings to enforce 
a judgment may issue immediately upon the 
entry of the judgment, unless the court 
in its discretion and on such conditions 
for the security of the adverse party as 
are proper, otherwise directs. 
Rule 62(d) Stay Upon Anneal. ll'hen an 
appeal is taken the appellant by giving 
a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, 
unless such a stay is otherwise pro-
hibited by law or these rules. The bond 
may be given at or after the time of filing 
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective 
when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court. 
Rule 73(d) Supersedeas Bond. Whenever an 
appellant ent1tled thereto desires a stay 
on appeal, he may present to the court for 
its approval a supersedeas bond which shall 
have such surety or sureties as the court 
requires. The bond shall be conditioned for 
the satisfaction of the judgment in full to-
gether with costs, interest, and damages for 
-16-
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delay, if for any reason the appeal is dis-
missed or if the judgment is affirmed, and to 
satisfy in full such modification of the 
judgment and such costs, interest, and damages 
as the appellate court may adjudge and award. 
When the judgment is for the recovery of 
money not otherwise secured, the amount of 
the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will 
cover the whole amount of the judgment re-
maining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, 
interest, and damages for delay, unless the 
court after notice and hearing and for good 
cause shown fixes a different amount or orders 
security other than the bond. When the judg-
ment determines the disposition of the prop-
erty in controversy as in real actions, 
replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages 
or when such property is in the custody of the 
sheriff or when the proceeds of such property 
or a bond for its value is in the custody or 
control of the court, the amount of the super-
sedeas bond shall be fixed at such sum only 
as will secure the amount recovered for the 
use and detention of the property, costs of 
the action, costs on appeal, interest, and 
damages for delay. 
Rule 73(e). Failure to File or Insufficienc 
of Bond. If a on on appeal or a superse eas 
bond is not filed within the time specified 
or if the bond filed is found insufficient, 
and if the record on appeal has not been filed 
in the Supreme Court, a bond may be filed at 
such time before the record is so filed as may 
be fixed by the District Court. After the 
record is so filed, application for leave to 
file a bond may be made only in the Supreme 
Court. 
The District Court's Order Granting Supersedeas 
(R. 44) provided that the plaintiff file and have approved 
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by this court a bond in the sum of $50,000 conditioned i: I 
accordance with Rule 73(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pn 
cedure. The plaintiff Hidden Meadows failed to abide by 
the court's order, and failed to abide by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. I 
The general function of a supersedeas bond and \ 
its effect upon the enforcement of a judgment is generall.
1
· 
set forth in 4 AmJur Zd Appeal and Error, Section 371 
where it is stated: 
The function of a supersedeas is to stay the 
enforcement of a judgment or decree of the 
court below brought up for review by appeal 
to effect a suspension of the power of the 
lower court to issue execution or other pro-
cess or to execute such process if already 
issued. Its effect is to restrain the success-
ful arty and the lower court from taking 
a firmat1ve act1on to en orce t e JU gment or 
decree. The supersedeas does not operate 
aga1nst the judgment 1tself, but aga1nst 
its enforcement. As a general rule, the 
supersedeas prevents all further proceedings 
in a subordinate court in the suit in which 
the judgment, order, or decree is rendered 
or made, except such as are necessary to 
preserve the rights of parties. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The general effect of a supersedeas bond is 
disclosed in 4-A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 662 11h:: 
it is stated: 
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The general rule is that the purpose or effect 
of a supersedeas or stay is to suspend or stay 
proceedings in the trial court, to preserve the 
status quo pending the determination of the 
appeal or proceeding in error, and to preserve 
to appellant the fruits of a meritorious appeal 
where they might otherwise be lost to him. 
The failure to file a supersedeas bond as required 
by the lower court's Order and by the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure validates any action taken by Dee ~ills and Evelyn 
I. ~1ills in transferring and selling the property which 
was the subject of the original option. Since the decision 
in the lower court was in their favor, they were free to 
do with this property as they desired unless such action 
was stayed by a supersedeas bond. 
The case law in the State of Utah is consistent 
with the general law irt allowing the prevailing party in a 
lower court to enforce that judgment or maintain a status 
quo until a supersedeas bond is filed in the Supreme Court 
staying all action between or among the parties in the 
lower court. In Skeen v. Pratt, 87 Utah 121, 48 P.Zd 457 
(1935), the Utah Supreme Court addressed itself to the 
purpose of a supersedeas bond in an action seeking a Writ 
of ~1andamus to command the District Court of Weber County 
-19-
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to vacate a sheriff's sale of real property. In holding 
that the lower court still had jurisdiction to hear a 
motion to vacate the sheriff's sale for impropriety, the 
Utah State Supreme Court cited with approval, Bancroft's 
Code Practice and Remedies, Vol. 8 page 8684, Section 656;: 
wherein it is stated: 
In the case of an appeal without supersedeas 
or stay, the judgment or order appealed from 
is enforceable as though no appeal had been 
taken. 
The court went on to state: 
The citation of additional authorities on this 
phase of the case would seem unnecessary, be-
cause if an appeal without a supersedeas bond 
wholly divests the trial court of power to en-
force the judgment or decree appealed from, the 
giving of a supersedeas bond would be meaning-
less. The sole purpose of a supersedeas bond 
is to stay the enforcement of the judgment or 
decree pending the &ppeal. 
Therefore, respondents failure to file and post 
the necessary supersedeas returned the true owners of t~ 
property to the same status they were in prior to the 
commencement of the action. Only if the lis pendens were 
effective through appeal would the lower court be correct 
in ruling that International Environmental Sciences, and 
ca-col Lee Christensen were not bona fide purchasers because 
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of the constructive notice provided by the lis pendens, 
which could not continue because Hidden Meadows failed to 
file supersedeas. The record and transcript of testimony 
is absolutely void of any evidence of personal or actual 
knowledge of the appeal on the part of Carole Lee 
Christensen, formerly Carole Lee Davis. 
There is substantial authority for the proposi-
tion that one who acquires rights in the subject matter of 
litigation pending ·appeal takes the property irrespective 
of the decision on appeal especially where the appellant 
fails to file a supersedeas. 
This law is based upon the theory that in order 
for the lis pendens to be effective on appeal, a super-
sedeas must be filed, thereby preserving the status of the 
case below and suspending all proceedings with regard to 
the judgment and enforcement thereof. 
A case directly on point is Chicago & N.W. Rail-
way Co. v. Garrett Strickler et. al, v. Chatterton, 339 
Ill. 297, 87 N.E. 1009 (1909), where appellants purchased 
certain real property from the prevailing party following 
a divorce action but prior to its reversal on appeal. 
-21-
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In reversing the lower court's ruling setting aside the 
conveyance the court stated: 
When appellants bought the property in 
controversy, the decree was in force. 
Had they bought before the writ of 
error was sued out, they would have 
acquired a title free from any claim of 
the ippellee for dower, for the law is 
well settled that, when a decree affect-
ing the title to property has been 
rendered by a court of equity, the 
rights of a purchaser in good faith, 
relying upon the decree before any 
writ of error is prosecuted or other 
action taken to avoid it, will be 
protected, nothwithstanding the decree 
is afterward reversed. Wadhams v. 
Gay, 73 Ill. 415; Barlow v. Standford, 
82 Ill. 298; Hannas v. Hannas, 110 
Ill. 53; Lambert v. Livingston, 131 
Ill. 161, 23 N.E. 352; Hammond v. 
People, 178 Ill. 503, 53 N.E. 308. 
Assuming, but.not deciding, that appel-
lants had notice of the pendency of 
the writ of error, we are brought to 
the question whether they took subject 
to the final disposition of the case. 
The writ of error was not a supersedeas. 
The decree was therefore not affected 
by it, but, until the judgment of 
reversal was rendered, was valid and 
effectual, entitled to full faith and 
credit in all courts, and enforceable 
by all appropriate means. Had it re-
quired the payment of alimony, such pay-
ment might have been enforced by execu-
tion or attachment in spite of the 
pendency of the writ of error. If it 
had been a decree of foreclosure, it 
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might have been executed during the pen-
dency of the writ of error by a sale 
·of the premises involved, and the pur-
chaser, if not a party to the suit, 
would have acquired a valid title not 
subject to be divested by the reversal 
of the decree. At common law the writ 
of error was itself a supersedeas, 
and no bail was required. A defendant, 
by suing out a writ of error, could 
stop all proceedings in execution of 
the judgment without giving any secur-
ity whatever. 1 Tidd's Pr. 530; 2 
Tidd's Pr. 1149; Bacon's Abridgment, 
Supersedeas, D, 4; Omaha Hotel Co. v. 
Kountze, 107 U.S. 378, 2 Sup. Ct. 911, 
27 L. Ed. 609. To avoid this evil 
various acts of parliament were passed 
requiring security in certain cases in 
order that the writ of error should 
operate as a supersedeas. Section 106 
of the practice act (Hurd's Rev. St: 
1908, c. 110) provides that no writ of 
error shall operate as a supersedeas 
unless the Supreme or Appellate Court 
as may be, or some judge thereof in 
vacation, after inspecting a copy of 
the record, shall so order, and the 
plaintiff in error shall file a bond as 
in case of appeal. Without such super-
sedeas, the doctrine of lis pendens 
has no application to a writ of error. 
"The writ of error without a sup·ersedeas 
does not, of itself, stay the proceed-
ing, and to argue otherwise would 
be to contend that a party might have 
the same relief upon a writ of error 
without supersedeas and without bond 
as he would be entitled to upon an 
appeal." Lancaster v. Snow, 184 Ill. 
163, 56 N.E. 416. Everybody was entitled 
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to act upon the decree as a valid decree, 
and rights acquired in good faith by 
strangers to the decree, whether with 
or without notice of the writ of error, 
cannot be affected by its reversal. 
The title of the appellants, Jones and 
Strickler, was not, therefore, subject 
to appellee's claim of dower. 
The order of the superior court will be 
reversed and the cause remanded, with 
directions to dismiss appellee's cross-
petition, and for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded, with directions. 
Also see Cairo Lumber Co. v. Corwin, 325 Ill. App. 319, 
N.E. 2d 110 (1945); Miller v. Dixon, 2 Kan. 445, 42 P. 
1014 (1895). 
It always has been and ought to remain "the 
policy of the law in this country to provide for free 
alienation of land"; especially where a self-executing 
judgment such as in the instant case confirms ownership 
and the right to convey property on the true and rightful 
owner. If it were not for the requirement of supersedeas 
in order to effectuate a stay on appeal, the entire risk 
would be placed on the prevailing party whose judgment is 
presumed valid and accurate. The failure on the part of 
Hidden Meadows to properly prosecute its appeal and obtai 
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a stay by filing and posting the appropriate supersedeas 
bars by estoppel Hidden Meadows from now seeking specific 
performance. It may properly have a remedy in damages 
against Mills under the option but it certainly shouldn't 
recover the real property conveyed to a third party, the 
return of which would produce inequitable results to all 
subsequent purchasers. 
POINT II. 
IN ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF THIS 
APPEAL, THESE APPELLANTS ADOPT THE 
POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 
WHOSE POSITION IS IDENTICAL WITH THESE 
APPELLANTS. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants assert that the lis pendens filed by 
Hidden Meadows was terminated by the final judgment of the 
lower court and in the failure of Hidden Meadows to file 
and post a supersedeas staying the effect of the lower 
court's judgment, which is presumed valid is evidenced by 
the necessity for posting supersedeas to effectuate a stay 
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while on appeal. If in fact, Hidden Meadows has a remedy, 
it is against Mills for monetary damages and not against 
third persons for specific performance./~ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ~ay of February, 
1978. 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DU~N 
_/ -·~~2~ ~~
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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